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Summary findings
Some  theorists  of ethnic  conflict  argue  that  the physical  Sambanis's  analysis is the  first  large-sample
separation  of warring  ethnic  groups  may  be the  only  quantitative  analysis  of the subject,  testing  the
possible  solution  to civil war.  Without  territorial  propositions  of partition  theory  and w;eighing heavily  on
partition  and  (if needed)  forced  population  movements,  the  side of its critics.
they  argue,  ethnic  war  cannot  end  and genocide  is likely.  He  shows  that  almost  all the assertions  of partition
Other  scholars  have counterargued  that  partition  only  theorists  fail to pass rigorous  empirical  tests.
replaces  internal  war with  international  war,  creates  He  finds  that,  on average,  partition  does  not
undemocratic  successor  states,  and  generates  tremendous  significantly  reduce  the  probability  of new  violence.  A
human  suffering.  better  strategy  might  be to combine  ethnic  groups,  but
So far this debate  has been  infornmed by few important  most  important  is to establish  credible  and  equitable
case studies.  systems  of  governance.
Sambanis  uses a new set  of data  on civil wars  to  it is also important  not  to load  the  strategy  with
identify  the main  determinants  of ethnic  partitions  and  subjective  premises  about  the necessity  of ethnically  pure
to  estimate  their  impact  on the probability  of war's  states  and about  the  futility  of interethnic  cooperation.
recurrence,  on low-grade  ethnic  violence,  and  on the
political  institutions  of successor  states.
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comments and suggestions.Introduction:  The  Theoretical  Case  for Partition
In two influential articles, Chaim Kaufmann (1996, 1998) developed a set of
hypotheses on the usefulness of ethnic partition as a solution to civil war, building on the
arguments of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera (1995). Before them, a first
wave theorists first considered the benefits and costs of partition. Among the
heavyweights of the first-wave theorists was Donald Horowitz, who wrote that:
"If the short  run is so problematical,  if the constraints  on policy  innovation  are many, if
even grand statements  need patchwork  readjustment,  perhaps it is a mistake to seek
accommodation  among  the antagonists.  If it is impossible  for groups  to live  together  in a
heterogeneous  state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one
homogeneous state, even if  this  necessitates population transfers. Separating the
antagonists-partition-is  an option  increasingly  recommended  for consideration  where
groups  are territorially  concentrated."  I
It is hard to argue with such a statement-assuming  that "the constraints of policy
innovation" and "the short run" can be accurately measured ex ante. In such a case, it
would be easy to recommend  partition to some countries while trying to patch up others.
Nevertheless, neither the first nor the second wave of theorists was able to suggest ways
to measure the barriers to ethnic reconciliation (except in the extreme case of genocide).
On the contrary, second wave theorists have taken the theory further to argue that all
ethnic wars that cross some critical (though still undefined) threshold of violence should
be resolved with partition-regardless  of the degree of territorial concentration of the
ethnic groups.
These views have fueled a scholarly and policy debate on the merits of ethnic
partition as a strategy to end ethnic wars. However, the debate has so far been based on a
few, albeit important, case-studies. Although it now has a history of several decades
(since the partition of India), partition theory remains largely untested, yet its intuitive
appeal has increased its popularity in academic and policy circles. To help policymakers
think about partition in concrete terms, I develop and use a new data-set of civil wars and
empirically test the set of hypotheses that constitute partition theory.
Let me first attempt to summarize the theory. According to the second wave of
partition theorists (who are the focus of this paper), violent ethnic conflict implies that
civil politics cannot be restored unless "ethnic groups are demographically separated into
defensible enclaves...  Solutions that aim at restoring multi-ethnic civil politics and at
' Donald Horowitz (1985, 588). See also Lijphart (1977, 44-47), Dahl (1971, 121) and
Huntington (1971, 14). This first wave of theorists was more careful and also discussed
difficulties with and dangers of partition; see, for example, a brief though insightful
discussion in Horowitz (1985, 588-91).
1avoiding population transfers-such  as power-sharing, state re-building, or identity
reconstruction-cannot  work because they do nothing to dampen the security dilemma"
(Kauftnann 1996, pp. 137, 139). The so-called "security dilemma" is at the core of
partition theory. It arises when one community faces a distrustful other and one's actions
to increase one's own security are perceived as threatening to the security of others
(Posen 1993).2
The dilemma is allegedly intensified when the opponents belong to different
ethnic groups: ethnic civil wars, argue partition theorists, are characterized by strong and
fixed identities based on ethnicity, by weak ideological and strong religious overtones, by
the use of tales of atrocities to strengthen mobilization, and by easy identification of
identities and a small scope for individual choice. In other words, because it is easy to
identify one's ethnic group, once a war starts, all members of the group must be
mobilized because other ethnic groups will inevitably recognize them as enemies
(Kaufimann  1996, 139-147). This inescapable destiny reinforces the dynamics of war and
must lead to partition since, "once ethnic groups are mobilized for war, the war cannot
end until the populations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions...
Ethnic separation ... allows ... cleansing and rescue imperatives [to] disappear; war is no
longer mandatory" (Kaufinann 1996, 150).
Even if we accept this fatalistic premise about the proclivity of ethnic groups
toward war, we must recognize that the partition theorists' assertions are just that-
simply assertions. Beyond a handful of self-selected cases, partition theorists have not
presented additional proof that partition is the only viable and credible solution to civil
war. They have not even proven that partition outperforms other war outcomes. Though
their theory is plausible under a set of explicit assumptions about ethnic group behavior,
partition theorists must be taken to task.
This paper provides a formal test of partition theory, starting with an overview of
other scholars' objections in the next section. It then identifies the main determinants of
partition and examines if partitions facilitate democratization in post-war states. It then
presents a set of tests of partition's hypothesized impact on war recurrence and low-grade
ethnic violence. This analysis rejects the most critical hypotheses of partition theory,
showing that partitions do not help prevent ethnic war recurrence and that they may not
even be necessary to stop even low-grade ethnic violence. Based on this analysis, I
propose an alternative hypothesis and a set of policies for the management of violent
ethnic conflict in the conclusion.
2 Such suspicion and fear would be supported by actual or perceived state collapse, which
transforms the domestic political environment into a near-anarchic environment that
cultivates the same antagonism as among states in the international system.
2Rebuttals  and  Counter-Rebuttals:  The  State  of the Debate
The idea that the international  community should support partitions to end civil
war has inspired substantial criticism. I summarize  the most significant critiques below:
Partition is a limiting solution. Ethnic cooperation may in fact be possible even
after civil war. Both ethnic diffusion (Byman 1997) and third-party security guarantees
(Walter 1997) could facilitate such cooperation. 3
Partition may also be too severe a solution. Forced population movements cause
tremendous human suffering and violate important human rights (Kumar 1997).
Endorsing ethnic partitions may in fact encourage partition movements in other
countries, increasing the number of wars worldwide (Byman 1997; Etzioni 1992/3;
Buchanan 1992).
Partitions create undemocratic successor states, likely to repress their minorities
as their predecessors did before them (Kumar 1997, Etzioni 1992/93; Schaeffer 1990).
Finally, successor states will rarely be ethnically homogeneous. They may
therefore incorporate new ethnic antagonisms (Byman 1997). Moreover, partition does
not resolve the underlying problem of ethnic rivalry, so it is possible for civil wars that
end in partition to be transformed into interstate wars between predecessor and successor
states (Byman 1997; Schaeffer 1990).
The debate between partition theorists and their critics is ongoing, though some of the
critiques listed above have already been settled in the literature. Below, I summarize three
important arguments which I believe have been settled by other scholars.
Successful Ethnic Partitions Do Not Encourage Partition Movements Elsewhere
Critics of partition theory have argued that, if the international community
supports partition in a few countries, it would be encouraging partitions elsewhere.
Kaufmnan  (1998) has successfully rebutted this criticism by arguing that the uncertainty
and extreme costs of civil war would discourage the initiation of partition movements
unless such movements are inevitable for domestic political reasons. Kaufman's position
is also supported by a set of persuasive analyses of the "international spread of ethnic
conflict," which has systematically  proven that cross-country contagion effects of ethnic
partition movements are rare (Lake and Rothchild 1998).
'Neither  Byman (1997) not Walter (1997) are self-proclaimed critics of partition theory
(Byman in fact supports partition under certain conditions). Some of their arguments,
however,  can be read as indirect critiques of partition theory.
3Successor States May Also Incorporate Ethnic  Conflict
According to partition theorists, the success of partition depends on the
demographic re-organization of the new territories and on the absence of militarily
significant minorities in the new states. However, in most actual cases of partition,
successor states are not ethnically pure. Thus, there is an empirical basis to question a
core premise of partition theory. 4 In the words of Donald Horowitz (1985, 589):
"...the linchpin of all the arguments  [for ethnic partition] is the assumption  that the
probable outcome of secession  and partition will be more homogeneous  states and,
concomitantly,  a  lower etinic  conflict level. If  the assumption were correct, the
conclusion  would follow.  But the assumption  is wrong: the only thing secession  and
partition are unlikely to produce is ethnically homogeneous  or harmonious  states"
(italics  added).
Furthermore, even if successor states were homogeneous, the mobilization
perspective of ethnic conflict (Lake and Rothschild 1996; DeFiguereido and Weingast
1997; Gagnon 1995) would suggest that, unless partition is accompanied by regime or
leadership reform, there is no guarantee that the political mobilization of ethnic groups in
successor states will not lead those states to war or to the repression of residual
minorities. Thus, the theory's claim that partition ends ethnic violence depends critically
on unrealistic premises about the ethnic composition and political institutions of
successor states.
Ethnic  Cooperation is Possible Even  Without Partition
Partition is not the only way to resolve the ethnic security dilemma. From a
theoretical standpoint, non-cooperative game theory can identify a number of conditions
under which a mutually beneficial Nash (i.e. non-cooperative) equilibrium can be
attained. From a practical perspective, Walter (1997) has shown that external security
guarantees have been successful in supporting the peaceful settlement of some civil wars. 5
This suggests that partition is certainly not the only viable solution to civil war.
Further, if a solution to ethnic competition for resources can be negotiated, then
the underlying causes of violent conflict may disappear, making peaceful transitions
popssible (Lake and Rothschild 1996). Even if competition persists, however, the
4 See Horowitz (1985), pp. 588-91 and chapters 2 and 6.
In Walter's argument, the security dilemma depends on an asymmetry of power between
the government and rebels. Walter (1997) notes that credible external security guarantees
are effective, though difficult. The difficulty in proving the credibility of the third parties'
commitment amounts to indirect support of the partition thesis, though only if partition is
proven to be more credible and less difficult to implement than a brokered settlement.
4rationalist perspective on wart would suggest that, as long as there is a decisive outcome
to the war, rational parties will not start a new war. 6
Finally, cooperation among ethnic groups may be possible if ethnic diffusion
increases as a result of the war-i.e.  if the opposite of partition takes place. Byman
(1997) has suggested that increased ethnic diffusion may mitigate the security dilemma,
since it would reduce the probability that a single ethnic group could become politically
and militarily dominant. Byman's argument derives from the theoretical literature on
international alliances and posits that ethnic "balancing" against threatening groups is
both possible and stabilizing. 7 A similar conclusion has been reached by a budding
political-economy literature on civil wars. A number of papers in that literature have
identified the determinants of civil war and some authors have found that the relationship
between ethnic division and the probability of civil war is non-monotonic-i.e.  the
probability of civil war is greatest in cases of ethnic polarization and lowest among
ethnically homogeneous or ethnically very diverse populations (Collier, Elbadawi, and
Sambanis, 1999).8  I return to this point in the conclusion.
I now turn to a series of tests of unresolved hypotheses in partition theory.
Taking  Sides:  New  Data  and  New  Empirical  Tests  of Partition  Theory
The four most important questions of partition theory are still unresolved:
(1) What are the main determinants of partition? (2) Does partition create democratic or
undemocratic states? (3) Is partition successful in preventing war-recurrence? And, (4)
does partition end low-grade ethnic violence (i.e. violence short of war)? I provide
answers to these questions using quantitative analysis of a new data-set described below.
Data  & Definitions
6 This follows the rationalist school (particularly Fearon 1995). War reveals private
information about relative power and resolve, removing the information asymmetry that
may lead rational parties to fight it out rather than opt for a more efficient bargain.
I However, ethnic balancing can also paralyze the state. See Wagner (1993) for such an
argument. Wagner argues that military victory, because it results in unitary political
systems, will be more stable than any peace agreement based on ethnic balancing.
8 There is further support of this view. Licklider (1995) has shown that identity (ethnic
and/or religious) wars are no less likely to end in a negotiated settlement than are non-
identity wars, apparently contradicting the predictions of partition theory. Gurr and Harff
(1994) and Mason and Fett (1996) can also be read as supporting this point.
5In the rest of the paper, I use a new data-set created by and used first in Doyle and
Sambanis (1999). The data-set includes all civil wars that started after 1944. My
definition of civil war draws on, but is not limited by, Singer and Small (1982) and
Licklider (1993; 1995).9  I have combined wars from several data-sets, including the
Correlates of War Project (1982; 1992), Licklider (1995), Walter (1997), Mason and Fett
(1996), Regan (1996), and Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997). I have added or removed
cases as appropriate, based on secondary and primary sources. Detailed documentation on
my coding and sources can be found in Appendix B."' The unit of observation in the data-
set is a war that has ended, though the data-set also includes six cases of ongoing wars to
capture the partition theorists' interest in partition not only as a way to prevent war-
recurrence, but also as a way to end ongoing wars."
Definition of partition
The variable denoting partition is PART; it equals one if an event of partition is
observed and zero otherwise. I understand partition as a war outcome that involves border
adjustment accompanied by demographic changes. This is a broad definition that differs
slightly from Kaufmann's (1998). To justify a narrower definition of partition, Kaufmann
(1998, 125) wrote that "we should focus on partition rather than secession cases ... to
assess whether international intervention reduces or increases the costs of ethnic
conflict." Thus, he defines partitions as "separations  jointly decided upon by the
responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of
imminent military victory by one side), or imposed on both sides by a stronger third
I I consider an armed conflict to be a civil war if (a) the war has caused more than one
thousand deaths; (b) the war challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized
state; (c) the war occurred within the recognized boundary of that state; (d) it involved the
state as one of the principal combatants; (e) and the rebels were able to mount an
organized military opposition, inflicting casualties on the state.
'B  Appendix B describes my sources and coding decisions and presents descriptive
statistics and other information on the variables in the data-set. Since it a long document
(over 100 pages), it cannot be included here, but it can be obtained directly from the
author along with the data-set used in this analysis. The most important difference
between my coding of wars and that of others, refers to the periodization of wars. I have
often broken a single observation of war in other data-sets into more observations or,
conversely, I have collapsed two or more observations in one. I did this by uniformly
applying a simple rule: I consider one or more war events to constitute a single
observation if the wars are between the same parties, over the same issues, not separated
by a substantial period of non-violence and/or the signing of a peace agreement or a
major truce.
Dropping those cases did not affect any of the models estimated in later sections.
6party. He then defines secessions as new states created by the unilateral action of a
rebellious ethnic group" (Kaufmnann  1998, 125, fn 12).
However, this narrower definition does not allow a full test of the partition
theorists' far-reaching propositions. Moreover, the narrow definition requires the re-
classification as secessions of cases originally treated as partitions in Kaufmann (1996);
and this definition is even problematic for some of the cases Kaufmann (1998) lists as
partitions. An example of the latter problem is the Cyprus case, which Kaufman (1998)
classifies as a defacto partition. However, the 1974 partition of Cyprus was neither the
outcome of the parties' agreement nor an imposition by a third party. Rather, this defacto
partition was the result of military victory by one side-the  Turkish side." 2
Given that the narrow definition is problematic even for Kaufhiann's own cases, I
use my broader definition and I combine the cases of partition and secession listed in
Kauflnann's 1996 and 1998 articles.' 3 I also add other cases that satisfy my definition but
are not in Kaufmann (1996, 1998). Since I am concerned with partition as a solution to
civil war, I do not consider cases of peaceful partition.' 4 Table 1 lists all partitions.
Insert Table 1 about here
12 It is well known to scholars of the Cyprus problem that Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriots constituted and acted as a single party both during the violent part of that
conflict (1963-1974) and during the subsequent negotiation phases (see Sambanis 1999).
13 Other studies also use the broad definition, given that the distinction between secession
and partition seems artificial. See, among others, Heraclides (1991) and Horowitz (1985),
who use the terms interchangeably.
14 I only consider post-World War II cases. Thus, I exclude the partition of Ireland (I
consider the subsequent Northern Ireland civil war as ongoing until the Good Friday
agreement is implemented). Cases of peaceful partition are also excluded: e.g., Slovenia
(1991); Macedonia (1992); Czechoslovakia (1993); Singapore (1965). I also exclude two
cases which I believe were erroneously classified as partitions in Kaufmann (1998, 1996).
I exclude Iraq (1991) because there is no recognized, functional, or even autonomous
Iraqi Kurdistan and the territory and its population would have been within reach of the
Iraqi military had it not been for the US-enforced no-fly zone. I also exclude Chechnya
(though this decision is debatable) because the partition effort was suppressed and
Chechnya is perhaps better described as 'effectively autonomous' rather than
independent. In any case, including these two cases would only strengthen subsequent
arguments in this paper.
7Although the cases of partition are known, the literature has not yet identified the
conditions under which partitions are likely to occur. In the next section, I identify a set
of relationships between the probability of partition and a set of explanatory variables.
What Are the Main Determinants of Partition?
Using my data-set of 126 cases of civil wars (which include 22 partitions), I
estimate four logistic models of the incidence of partition." 5 The explanatory variables
include the type of the war (was it an ethnic/religious,  or ideological war?); the war's
human toll (number of deaths and displacements); the depth of ethnic divisions in the
country; the outcomes of the war (did it end in a truce, a settlement, or a decisive military
victory?); and a number of socio-economic indicators of the country's overall level of
development. Table 2 presents the statistical results.
Insert Table 2 about here
The type of the war is an important determinant of partition. Identity wars (i.e.
ethnic and religious wars) are strongly and positively correlated with partition in models
1-3. Model 4, which controls for income inequality and for the country's overall level of
economic development, shows a weaker correlation between identity wars and partition
than the previous three models." 6 Overall, however, all four models suggest that partition
is more likely to occur following an identity war rather than an ideological war, which
seems to justify the partition theorists' preoccupation with ethnicity.
Looking deeper into the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and partition,
however, I do not find a significant correlation between the two. Ethnic heterogeneity
(measured as an index of racial, religious, and linguistic divisions) is not a significant
determinant of partition when it is entered independently in the equation. However, when
ethnic heterogeneity is multiplied with population size, I find their interaction to be
positively and significantly correlated with partition in all four models (Table 2). This
suggests that, controlling for the other explanatory variables, partition will likely occur
only when ethnic groups are large. Large ethnic groups may be better able to overcome
the coordination problems associated with mounting an effective rebellion and may stand
a better chance of establishing a viable new state after partition.
11  All four models (with robust standard errors) have good fit to the data (the pseudo-R 2
ranged from 48.4% to 53.7% and the classification success ranged from 88% to 91.94%).
16 In model 3b, I dropped the 6 cases of ongoing war. The results were unaffected. In
model 4, identity wars (WARTYPE) are significant at the 10% level. I proxy overall
economic development by the level of pre-war per capita energy consumption. There is a
mild negative correlation between identity wars and income inequality (-0.1157) and a
higher positive correlation between identity wars and economic development levels
(0.16) which may explain the increase in the standard error of WARTYPE in model 4.
8Quite expectedly, I find that partitions are positively and significantly correlated
with the level of violence (measured as the natural log of deaths and displacements--
LOGCOST). This variable is very robust and, since deaths and displacements
chronologically precede the occurrence of partition, these results may suggest a causal
relationship between high levels of violence and partition." 7
War outcomes were also very significant determinants of partition in all four
models. There were no partitions if the government won a military victory. By contrast,
informal truces and rebel victories are significant and positively correlated with partition.
Testing the relationship between partition and socio-economic indicators, I found a set of
economic variables in model 2 individually insignificant, but a joint significance test of
five variables suggests that socio-economic  variables are  jointly significant if we control
for time and place." 8 In model 4, I found a positive correlation between the level of energy
consumption (a proxy for overall development) and the probability of partition.
Income inequality is also significant, though negatively correlated with partition,
suggesting that partition is more likely when there is more income equality, which seems
counter-intuitive." 9 The dummy variables for geographical location and for the decade
during which the war started pick up time- and place-specific effects, but are insignificant
in most models. War duration is non-significant (results not reported), which suggests
that partition is equally likely after short or long wars.
To summarize, I find that partitions are more likely after costly ethnic and
religious wars in countries with large ethnic groups and a relatively higher level of
economic development as well as in cases that the war ended in rebel victory or informal
truce. Having identified these correlates of partition, I can now test the three critical
hypotheses of partition theory: (1) that partitions create successor states that are at least as
17  Even if we only measure deaths and not refugees (as in the LOGDEAD variable), the
results are unaffected (see estimates of model 1).
II  The joint significance test of (GEO, DECADE, ILLIT, GDP, LIFES) yields a X2(5) =
16.23, with Prob >  x  = 0.0062. The lack of individual significance is probably due to
inflated standard errors due to few degrees of freedom and considerable colinearity
among the right-hand-side variables. The signs of these variables are also influenced by
these colinearities, thus I do not interpret them.
19 The direction of this correlation, however, may be due to measurement error since
reliable data was often not available for the relevant years; or it may be due to colinearity
between income inequality and energy consumption, since I used GDP data to impute
missing values of both of these variables.
9democratic as their predecessors, if not more so; (2) that partitions reduce the risk of war-
recurrence; and (3) that partitions reduce low-level ethnic violence after the war ends.
Does Partition Create Undemocratic States?
Kaufmann (1998, 124) has argued that successor states are generally no less
democratic than their predecessors and that they can even be more democratic. I test this
hypothesis using data on levels of democracy and autocracy in all countries in my
sample. 20 I created a variable labeled GURR, measuring the level of democracy two
(GURR2) and five years (GUJRR5)  after the end of the war. 2" Note that I include both
predecessor and successor states in the list, since we should care about what happens to
the political institutions of both after partition.
Partitioned countries have a mean and standard deviation of GUJRR2  of 9.82 and
6.14, respectively. The corresponding values for non-partitioned countries were 7.95  and
6.36, respectively. A score of 20 would have suggested a complete democracy, whereas a
score of 0 a perfect autocracy. The computed averages reveal that countries that have
experienced a civil war, regardless of whether or not they have been partitioned, are non-
democratic two years after the end of the war. This may be an outcome of the war or it
may be due to a legacy of undemocratic institutions. To measure those "legacies," I
created a variable labeled GURRLAG5, measuring the average democracy index during
the five years prior to the start of the war. In Table 3, I list all partitions and their GURR2
and GURRLAG5 indices. I find eight cases that support Kaufmann's hypothesis that
successor states are no less democratic than their predecessors and five cases that do not
support that hypothesis.
Insert Table 3 about here
These results, however, are only descriptive. More analytical results can be
obtained by estimating multi-variable OLS regressions of GURR2 (and GURR5) using
partition (PART) among the explanatory  variables. The results of such regressions are
presented in Table 4, showing clearly that partition is not significantly correlated with the
level of democracy in countries  just out of a civil war. Nearly all of the other control
20 The original data was created by Tedd Gurr and has been used widely in the
international relations literature, especially to facilitate tests of the democratic peace
theory. See Gurr's data and codebook at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/
211  I added Gurr's democracy and autocracy scores using his Polity3 (May 1996) data as
follows: GURR = [DEMOCRACY+  (10-AUTOCRACY)].  The resulting variable ranges
from 0 to 20. The Polity3, May 1996 data ends in 1994, so I imputed 35 missing values
out of 121 cases using the political rights index of the Freedom House project after I
established that there was a very close correlation between Gurr's democracy index and
Freedom House's political rights index.
10variables are significant, however. There is a strong positive correlation between
democratic post-conflict states and the presence of third-party peace operations. There is
also a negative significant relationship between the level of democracy and the size of the
government's military, which suggests that troop demobilization and force reductions in
post-conflict states may be necessary to promote peace and democracy after civil war.
War duration is also highly significant and positively correlated with the level of
democracy. Real per capita GDP is positively correlated with democracy (as we would
expect). Also, the country's political "legacy" (GURRLAG5 index) is positively
correlated with post-war democracy levels. 22
Insert Table 4 about here
These regression results reveal that neither Kauftnan nor his critics are right since
partition is unrelated to post-war levels of democracy. Thus, the concern over
democratization processes in post-war states should be focused not on partition, but rather
on designing the correct mix of institutional, political, and economic policies, given the
conflict's nature and intensity. I now turn to the second key hypothesis of partition
theory.
Does Partition Prevent War Recurrence?
While partition theorists have argued that territorial and demographic partition
ends civil war, critics of partition theory have argued that partitions simply substitute
international for internal war and that ethnic war may still be possible within the
boundaries of successor states (Byman 1997; Licklider 1995). There seem to be several
examples of wars following partitions to support the critics: Croatia fought a second war
with Serbia after Yugoslavia's partition in 1991. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bitter
territorial war in 1999. The partition of Somaliland collapsed in a wave of new violence
in 1992. India and Pakistan fought three wars since their partition in 1947. Cyprus was at
war again in 1974 after it was effectively partitioned into militarily defensible, self-
administered enclaves between 1963-67.
These examples, however, do not constitute sufficient proof that the critics are
right. To develop better insight into the relationship between partition and war recurrence,
I present simple cross-tabulations of partition and war recurrence and low-grade violence
in Table 5.23  No statistical association between partition and ending violence is evident.
2  These regression results are robust for a number of specifications and do not change if
we control for the possible endogeneity of partition, using two-stage least squares
models.
23 Table 5 includes cases of non-ethnic partition. I also ran these cross-tabs excluding non-
identity (ethnic/religious)  wars and the results were not at all affected.
11Insert Table 5 about here
A better test of the relationship between partition and no-war recurrence can be
derived by estimating multi-variable models of no-war recurrence. I estimate such a
model where the dependent variable is WAREND, with the suffixes 2, 5, and 10 denoting
that it is observed 2, 5, and 10 years after the end of the civil war. WAREND is coded 1 if
there is no war recurrence and zero otherwise. 24 According to several studies, most of my
explanatory variables are significant determinants of war termination. 25
The models in Table 6 are very robust to specification tests. The partition variable
is an exception, since its estimated coefficient is extremely variable. Few linear
combinations of three variables make partition barely significant at the 5-10% level (e.g.
the number of land borders, major-power involvement, and the GURRLAG5 variable).
However, partition is completely insignificant when other specifications are used. More
importantly, if I control only for the number of deaths and not for the number of
displaced persons, this yields non-significant coefficients for partition in all models. 26
Insert Table 6 about here
24I  estimate probit models with clustered same-country observations and robust standard
errors. Since partition theory has focused on ethnic wars and since I found the type of war
to be a significant determinant of partition, I dropped all cases of non-identity wars from
the sample. I later estimated the same models using all the data while controlling for the
type of war and reached consistent results.
25 The explanatory variables and the researchers who identified their importance are: war
duration (Mason and Fett 1996); size of the government's military (Mason and Fett
1996); war outcomes (Licklider 1995; Walter 1997); ethnic heterogeneity and population
size (Collier and Hoeffler 1999); deaths and displacements (Licklider 1995; Doyle and
Sambanis 1999); and income per capita (Collier 1998). Other variables may be relevant,
but they are mostly binary and adding them to the model increases the risk of colinearity
and inflates the standard errors. I experimented with some of them: MAJOR (was a major
power involved?); INTERVEN (was there a third-party intervention?); PEACEOP (was
there a third -party peace operation and, if so, what was the type of operation?);
BORDER (number of land borders); DECADE (decade the war started); COLDWAR
(was it a cold-war conflict?); and GURRLAG5 (pre-war 5-year average level of
democracy).
26 The LOGCOST variable includes measures of refugees and internally-displaced
persons. Measurement error is very likely in this case and refugee flows due to partition
are not necessarily excluded from measures of displacements (as in Cyprus, India, etc).
Thus, LOGDEAD, which only measures deaths, may be a more accurate measure of cost
(yet I continue to use LOGCOST in several models and in the endogeneity tests presented
in Table 6 so as not to stack the cards against partition theory arbitrarily).
12Both models 1 and 2 in Table 6 reveal a positive though insignificant correlation
between partition and no-war recurrence. This is important evidence against partition
theory, since it suggests that partitions are not significantly different than non-partitions
with respect to their impact on war recurrence, controlling for other important variables.
The human cost of the war in both models 1 and 2 is positively correlated with
war-recurrence. 2" War outcomes are also very important, though their precise impact is
hard to interpret. 28 War duration is significant and positively correlated with no-war
recurrence. This result is consistent with the findings of Mason and Fett (1996) and
supports the "war weariness" hypothesis (parties engaged in long conflicts grow tired of
war and are less likely to repeat it).29  The size of the government's military is also
significant and positively associated with no-war recurrence. This result contradicts
Mason and Fett (1996) who suggest a negative correlation. GDP per capita is significant
and positively correlated with war recurrence, a finding which confinns the revenue-
seeking  economic  models  of civil war (Collier  1998; Collier and Hoeffler  1999).3°
The interaction of ethnic heterogeneity and population (EHPOP) is not at all
significant in models 1 and 2, despite the emphasis on ethnic heterogeneity in the civil
war literature (Kaufmiann  1998, 1996; Collier and Hoeffler 1999). This important result is
broadly consistent with Fearon and Laitin's (1996) analysis of the potential for inter-
ethnic cooperation and it is robust to different measures of ethnic division and different
model specifications. Since other studies (Collier, Elbadawi and Sambanis 1999) have
found that ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization  is a significant determinant of
the initiation of civil wars, the present findings suggest that civil war initiation and war
recurrence are different phenomena with regard to the impact of ethnicity.
27 The sign of LOGCOST and LOGDEAD in models 1 and 2 is negative, indicating that
the higher the human cost, the lower the probability of no-war recurrence.
28 The OUTCOME2 variable-a  categorical variable denoting if the war ended in a truce,
rebel victory, government victory, or peace settlement-is  highly significant in both
models 1 and 2, though interpreting its sign is not straight-forward.  By disaggregating
OUTCOME2, I find some of its components to be highly correlated with partition. Thus,
entering them independently in the regression would increase colinearities. These
correlations also generate sufficient concern over the possible endogeneity of partition
(PART) when both OUTCOME2 and PART are both included in the model.
29 I thank Russ Leng for pointing this out to me.
3  These models use GDP as a proxy for the taxable base of the country, which also
captures the potential for "lootable" economic resources. Thus, the greater the GDP, the
greater the incentives for loot-motivated  war.
13Models 1 and 2 reveal results that pertain to the very short-term, since the
dependent variable (WAREND2) is observed just two years after the end of the war. To
see if the models' results also hold in the medium-term, I estimated model 2 both five and
ten years after the end of the war and found that the model's fit worsened with time. 3' A
striking result is that, in the 10-year  model, ethnic heterogeneity (interacted with
population size) and war duration are no longer significant, but partition is now
significant and negatively correlated with no-war recurrence. 32
These findings build a strong case against partition theory. I find that partition is
not a significant determinant of war recurrence and that, in the longer-term, partitions
may even inspire new conflicts.
An important methodological point with substantive implications is that these
inferences depend critically on the assumption that partition is exogenous to war
recurrence. That assumption makes sense, since war recurrence is observed well after
partition is observed. However, these two dependent variables have explanatory variables
in common, so there is concern over the possible endogeneity of partition. I therefore
estimated several models assuming partition is endogenous and I tested its exogeneity
(the technical details of these models and an explanation of the statistical concept of
endogeneity are relegated to the appendix). The results are presented in Table 6.
Models 4-5 in Table 6 treat partition as an endogenous variable, but partition is
still not significantly correlated with no-war recurrence. 33 Model 3 incorporates a test of
exogeneity (a t-test of the estimated coefficient of ERROR, the prediction error in the
first-stage equation-see  appendix). Based on this test, we cannot reject that partition is
exogenous to no-war recurrence and we should accept the findings of models 1-2.
In conclusion, this section has proven that the partition theorists' assertion that
partition is the only possible solution to civil war is not supported by the evidence. Hopes
of preventing future ethnic wars constitute the most important reason for which some
scholars and policymakers have advocated ethnic partition. This analysis proves that the
scholars were wrong and that, if policymakers do endorse ethnic partition, they should
not do so in hopes of preventing future wars.
3' The pseudo-R 2 for the 5-year model was 17.3  1% with 76 observations and a Wald X 2
statistic with six degrees of freedom was equal to 18.65, with Prob >  = 0.0048.
32 The marginal impact of the partition variable was (-.355) and its robust standard error
(.1365) with a z-value of (-2.34) and P >  Izl  = 0.019. The model had a Wald X 2 (6) =
15.27 with Prob >  x2 = 0.0183, 61 observations, and a pseudo-R 2 = 19.40%.
33  These results are replicated in the 2-Stage Least Squares linear probability model of
WAREND2 with robust standard errors (model 5), which is estimated using the same
instruments as in the 2-Stage Probit of model 4. Again partition is not significant. This
results holds after dropping the six cases of ongoing war.
14Does Partition End Ethnic  Violence Short of War?
The third critical hypothesis in support of partition is that the physical separation
of ethnic groups will reduce low-grade ethnic violence (i.e. violence short of war). In this
section, I empirically test this hypothesis and find that, under well-specified conditions,
partition is indeed positively and significantly correlated with an end to low-grade
violence. This correlation, however, is due to partition's endogeneity to war outcomes
and is not robust to different model specifications.
The dependent variable is now NOVIOL, coded one if there is no low-grade
violence after the end of the war and zero otherwise. The variable takes the suffixes 2 and
5 when it is measured 2 and 5 years after the end of the war, respectively.
Regressing NOVIOL2 on the explanatory variables from the war-recurrence
model, I find that partition is not significantly correlated with an end to low-grade
violence (see model 1, Table 7). However, this is a poor model, since partition is
negatively correlated to no-violence (we would expect the opposite) and two key
variables (size of the military and GDP per capita) are insignificant.
Insert Table 7 about here
Thus, I estimate a fully-parameterized  model which finds partition to be
significant and positively correlated to an end of low-grade violence (Model 2, Table 7).34
The significance of partition, however, is not robust to small deviations from model 2.
For example, in model 3, I control for rebel victory rather than for all military outcomes
and for the number of deaths rather than for the number of deaths and displacements, and
I find partition to be insignificant. The partition variable is extremely fragile to different
specifications of the model, in contrast to most of the other explanatory variables (such as
human cost, war duration, war outcome, and the type of UN peace operations). Thus, I
can only present weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that partitions help end low-
Model 2 was not designed to achieve the best possible prediction of no-violence, but
was rather designed to increase the significance of the partition variable. I checked how
well model 2 explains violence outcomes five and ten years after the end of the war (see
the last two columns of Table 7). The dependent variables corresponding to the 2- and 5-
year periods are NOVIOL5 and NOVIOLlO, respectively. I found that partition is barely
significant at the 10% level in the 5-year model. Ten years after the end of the war, I find
no significant correlations between no-violence and any of my explanatory variables.
Partition now has a negative correlation with an end to low-grade violence. However, the
10-year  model has very poor fit (see table 7), suggesting that patterns of violence during
post-war transitions are highly time-specific. War-to-peace transitions are evolving
processes that do not depend in a stable manner on the same determinants over time.
15grade ethnic violence. More importantly, this positive impact of partitions on reducing
low-grade violence is conditional on the involvement of a major power, on the patterns of
third-party partial intervention in the war, on the type of war outcome, on the degree of
ethnic heterogeneity (which is now significant  without controlling for the size of the
ethnic groups), and on the size of refugee movements during the war.
To confirm that these results are not influenced by the potential endogeneity of
partitions to low-grade violence, I test once again for exogeneity and present the results in
Table 8.35  Column 3 of Table 8 shows that partition is in fact endogenous in model 2
(since the coefficient of ERROR1 is significant at the 5% level). Controlling for
endogeneity does not change the results (partition is also significant in the model of
column 1, which assumes exogeneity).  These results, however, are extremely sensitive to
small changes in the model's specification. Both the endogeneity and the significance of
the partition variable (PART) are entirely dependent on the measurement of the human
cost variable (i.e. the choice between LOGCOST and LOGDEAD). This is evident in a
comparison of the estimated parameters in models 2 and 3 in Table 8 (model 2 controls
for war displacements and military outcomes; model 3 controls for people killed and
rebel victory). There is no endogeneity or significance for partitions in model 3 (columns
4-6).
Insert Table 8 about here
I should note again (see appendix) that that the endogenous probit models produce
inefficient (biased) standard errors, though the efficiency loss is small. Thus, we may rely
with caution on the significance levels of the variables of interest, since the estimated
standard errors may actually be larger. This is not of concern, however, since we have
seen that the endogeneity of partitions is removed by small specification changes and we
can therefore rely on the simple probit estimates (which treat partitions as exogenous).
Nevertheless, to gauge the level of possible bias in the previous results, I
estimated a relatively parsimonious model (dropping non-significant variables) and
contrasted the simple probit estimator to various two-stage models. I present these results
in Table 9. The first column includes estimates from a simple probit. Column two reports
estimates of a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) linear probability model, the results of which
are consistent with those of the exogenous model in column 1. Column three reports the
35 I used the estimation method suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988), estimating the
reduced form of the first-stage equation, obtaining predicted values of partition (PART)
and the residual, and using the residual as an explanatory variable in addition to the
original value of PART in the second (structural) equation. Since this method is almost
identical to Bollen, Guilky, and Mroz (1995-see  appendix), I also entered the predicted
values (PPART) independently in columns 2 and 5 of Table 8 (assuming endogeneity).
Note that the results presented in Table 8 are consistent with results reached using the
Newey (1987) method or 2SLS linear probability models of no-violence.
16results of a 2-stage probit model using the Bollen, Guilky, and Mroz (1995) method. 36
Column 4 offers an exogeneity test since it includes the actual PART variable and the
residual (ERRORI) from the first-stage regression, following the Rivers and Vuong
(1988) method. There is no evidence of endogeneity of PART. Column 5 includes
bootstrapped estimates of the coefficients and standard errors of the 2-stage probit
(column 3) estimates to evaluate the level of bias. The mean bootstrapped coefficient of
partition (PPART) is very close to the estimated coefficient of PPART in column 3 (the
bias is -.03; the bias-corrected confidence interval is -2.03175, 2.183518), which confirms
the Monte-Carlo simulation results discussed in the appendix. 3 ' The bootstrapped
standard errors, however, increase relatively more, which would further confirm that
partition is not significant in the 2-stage probit model. In any case, since the t-test of the
ERROR1 variable in column 4 does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that
partition is exogenous, we should rely on the estimates from the simple probit in column
1, which show an insignificant correlation between partition and no-low-grade violence.
Insert Table 9 about here
To summarize, I find only weak support of the hypothesis that partitions are
significant for an end to low-grade ethnic violence after civil war. Models which support
that hypothesis are very sensitive to small specification changes. Although I detected
endogeneity in some of these models (partition is endogenous to military outcomes and
large-scale population movements during the war), this does not affect the results. The
models controlling for endogeneity are also not robust. The substantive conclusion is that,
supporting partitions and population movements that deny people their human rights and
uproot them from their homelands does not necessarily save them from ethnic violence.
36 This method produces consistent though asymptotically  inefficient standard errors. I
estimated both the first- and second-stage equations using a probit model, unlike the
model in Bollen, Guilky, and Mroz (1995). This generalization of their method can be
found in Madalla (1983). The instruments used were the same as in previous models.
3  Alvarez and Glascow (2000) and Guilky and Mroz (1992), cited in Bollen, Guilky, and
Mroz (1995) present evidence from Monte Carlo simulations regarding the negligible
bias of the two-stage probit estimates. I use a bootstrapping technique (developed by
Efron 1979, 1982) to estimate coefficients and standard errors. Bootstrapping works as
follows: N observations are randomly drawn with replacement from my data-set one
thousand times. The random draws are based on a random number. To generate
reproducible results, I set the number seed to 1111. This process generates the
distributions of statistics of interest (in this case the coefficient and standard errors of
partition and the other explanatory  variables in my model). Based on these distributions, I
computed the means and standard deviations of these statistics (reported in Table 9).
17Conclusion
Population movements to partition states during or after civil wars are by their
nature coerced, painful, and very costly. They violate important human rights, cause
tremendous physical and emotional suffering, and may sow the seeds of future conflicts.
It is therefore imperative that international policy toward ethnic partitions be informed by
rigorous and empirically-verified arguments, rather than by untested theory.
In this paper, I have provided a host of such arguments, starting with an empirical
investigation into the determinants of partitions. I have found that partitions are likely to
occur as a result of costly ethnic/religious  wars that end in rebel victory or truce and in
countries with better-than-average socio-economic  conditions.
My analysis has also shown that the differences between ethnic and non-ethnic
wars with respect to war termination and partition are small. The relationship between the
degree of ethnic heterogeneity and the need for partition is not as straight-forward as
partition theorists assume. 38 The finding that partition does not significantly prevent war-
recurrence suggests that ethnic cooperation may indeed be possible after civil war without
partition. At the very least, this shows that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the
problem of violent ethnic antagonism. Further, my analysis reveals that partition is only
associated with the presence of large ethnic populations, not with ethno-linguistic or
religious fractionalization  per se.
Therefore, as a corollary to this conclusion, future research might test the
proposition that combining rather than partitioning ethnicities after civil war may in fact
be more effective. Thinking along these lines would perhaps be very useful for Africa in
particular, given the ongoing debate about the redefinition of African borders in the hope
that this would reduce the incidence of civil wars (see, e.g., Herbst 1996/7). Partition
theorists would argue for the partition of warring African states into a multitude of mini-
states composed of a single ethnicity. Based on the empirical findings of this paper, I
would put forth a rival hypothesis: if borders can in fact be re-drawn, combining several
ethnic groups in a larger multi-ethnic state would reduce the probability of new wars.
This paper has also found that partitions are not significantly correlated with
democratization, contrary to partition theorists' assertions. Democratization has been
38 In the words of Donald Horowitz (1985, 135): "Is there any reason to believe that the
more pronounced the cultural differences that exist between groups, the greater the ethnic
conflict? There has been no shortage of offhanded assertions that cultural differences
engender ethnic conflict. But... systematic statements of the relationship are more
difficult to find."
18identified as a crucial determinant of domestic peace in theoretical and quantitative
studies (Doyle 1997; Collier, Elbadawi, and Sambanis 1999). Thus, international policy
aiming to prevent war recurrence or to stop ethnic violence should promote institution-
building and economic reconstruction rather than partition. If partition did lead to more
democratic states, as partition theorists argue, then endorsement of partitions might have
been justifiable as an indirect way to promote peace through democratization. However,
this paper has shown that there is no significant correlation between democratization and
partition during war-to-peace transitions. Having identified a host of important
determinants of democratization during the crucial two-to-five years following the end of
a civil war, I would argue that the international community should try to enhance the
potential for democratization by providing peace operations and economic assistance
instead of focusing on dividing states. Finally, I found that post-war democratization
processes are more successful in countries that enjoyed democratic institutions before the
war. Thus, my analysis suggests that democracy  breeds more democracy, even if violent
ethnic war intervenes.
This paper has also analyzed  the determinants of war recurrence and has found
that the probability of a new war increases as the deaths and displacements also increase,
as per capita income rises, and as divided ethnic groups become larger. 39 By contrast,
military outcomes to the war and a strong government army significantly reduce the
probability of war recurrence. Thus, if the international community's interest lies in
preventing new civil wars, it could take steps to enhance the government's military and
support decisive outcomes to civil wars. Such a strategy, however, might be indirectly
supporting political repression.
Partition theorists would tend to agree with this last point, since they argue that
ethnic minorities will be victimized unless they are partitioned. However, my analysis has
rejected that hypothesis (although it did so with the narrowest margin of confidence
among all the tests included in this paper). I have found only weak evidence that
partitions are significant in ending low-grade ethnic violence (i.e. violence short of war).
Thus, while it may be true that decisive war outcomes may increase political repression,
there is no evidence that partition fares any better in that regard. Furthermore, I have
found that the probability of ongoing low-grade violence increases with the number of
dead and displaced people from the previous war, as it does if the war ends indecisively
(e.g. in a truce), if the government military is strong (which tends to support the
repression thesis), and if third-parties stage partial interventions. By contrast, the
probability of low-grade violence is lower if wars last long (supporting the war-weariness
hypothesis), if UN peace operations are used, and if the rebels achieve a military victory.
3  This correlation between GDP and war recurrence may seem counter-intuitive since we
saw that higher GDP is correlated with higher democratization, which is negatively
correlated with civil war. The impact of GDP is ambiguous because GDP can be a proxy
for both the country's overall development level, which should be positively associated
with peace, and a proxy for "loot," inciting new wars (Collier and Hoeffler 1999).
19Fine-tuning a war-to-peace transition is a difficult task because peacebuilding
strategies can often backfire. For example,  promoting economic growth may assist
democratization and promote peace, but it can also lead to new wars by expanding the
potential economic gains from a new rebellion. Strategies to support the government's
pre-war institutions and its military may also achieve  peace, but they may do so at the
expense of justice. Muddling through this difficult terrain, I would therefore propose an
empirically-derived strategy to resolve ethnic wars and prevent their recurrence. This
strategy demands a lot: it demands action by the international community, which must
take proactive measures to promote democracy  to prevent political conflicts from turning
violent. If violence does erupt, however, rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers can help,
as can the facilitation of negotiated settlements which would ideally result in the
integration and downsizing of the government's military. These are time-honored
strategies of conflict management which can be effective, according to this empirical
analysis. Finally, if border redefinition is an option in the settlement process-and  it
should be an option only if it does not victimize one party to assist others-then  ethnic
diffusion rather than ethnic concentration may potentially be a better goal.
In extreme cases, partition may be necessary, indeed inevitable. If years-perhaps
decades-of  violence have proven that the political, cultural, and physical survival of
ethnic minorities is impossible without physical separation, then partition should indeed
be a policy option to consider. Nevertheless much more focused research is necessary to
identify the conditions that would justify partition. If ethnic groups lived intermingled
and intermarried before the war, if they had a pre-war history of peaceful cohabitation
and relatively democratic political institutions, and if third parties could offer security
guarantees for the first critical years after the war's end, then there is no reason to believe
that partition is the only "possible" end to civil war.
On the contrary, this paper has shown that on average, partition does not
significantly reduce the probability of new violence and may even sow the seeds of future
conflict. To reduce the risk of ethnic violence, a better strategy would be to try to
establish equitable and credible systems of governance or even to combine rather than
separate ethnic groups. In addition to being potentially more successful, this strategy is
also not loaded with subjective and arbitrary assumptions about the necessity for
ethnically pure states and about the futility of inter-ethnic cooperation.
20Appendix: Testing for the Possible Endogeneity of Partitions
The results of models 1 and 2 in Table 6 were based on the assumption that
partition is exogenous to war recurrence. However, a number of explanatory variables are
correlated with both partition and no-war recurrence, which causes concern for the
possible endogeneity of partition. In such a case, the inferences made about the
relationship of partition to no-war recurrence and no-violence would be incorrect. Thus,
this appendix discusses the problem of endogeneity and explains how it can be addressed.
Partition (P) and war recurrence (W) form a system of simultaneous equations:
p=c  + PIMi + 1  2XA+ i  (1),
Wi =Y+1 3Pi+PA 4 M +1sZi +[i  (2),
where equation (1) determines the incidence of partition (P) and equation (2) determines
war-recurrence (W). MN  is a vector of common variables in the two equations and 13  is
the vector of coefficients of Mi; XY  is a vector of instrumental variables (correlated with
partition but not with war-recurrence)  and P 2 is a vector of their coefficients; Z; is a
vector of variables that are correlated with war-recurrence and  _s  is a vector of their
coefficients. Endogeneity stems from the possible correlation between si and kt  (both of
them disturbance terms with mean zero and no correlation to the other explanatory
variables). The presence of common explanatory variables in equations (1) and (2) (i.e.
the variables in M1) implies that s, and p, may be correlated, in which case, a simple
probit regression would produce biased estimates.
Thus, we must estimate a model that generates consistent estimates while
correcting for the endogeneity without significant efficiency loss. Following Bollen,
Guilkey and Mroz (1995) and Rivers and Vuong (1988), I used the two-stage probit
model, which has been shown to have attractive properties in relation to alternative
estimators. 40 The procedure is very similar to 2SLS: I estimate the reduced form of
equation 1 using a probit regression, obtaining predicted values (PHAT) of the dependent
variable (PART). 41 I then compute the error of that prediction and plug the predicted
40 The choice of estimator depends on the number of observations, the degree of
identification of the model, and number of potentially endogenous variables, and the
goodness of fit of equation 1. For a theoretical/technical discussion of these
considerations, see Bollen, Guilky, and Mroz (1995); Rivers and Vuong (1988); Newey
(1987); and Alvarez and Glasgow (1999). Political science applications of this procedure
are Alvarez and Butterfield (1999) and Alvarez (1997).
"'  Note that, use of this method is strictly based on attaining an P7 no smaller than 10% in
21values (PHAT) into equation 2, replacing PART. PHAT is uncorrelated with the
disturbance term in equation 1. Then, I estimate equation (2) using a probit regression
with robust standard errors and clustered same-country observations, obtaining consistent
estimators of the coefficients. The standard errors will be asymptotically inefficient
(Amemiya 1978). However, evidence from small-sample Monte Carlo simulations has
shown that the efficiency loss is very small. 42 To determine if the two-stage or simple
probit estimates should be used, I apply a simple exogeneity test, which involves a t-test
of the estimated coefficient of the prediction error (ERROR) which is added as a
regressor along with the actual value of PART in equation 2.  If ERROR is non-
significant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that PART is exogenous.
Applying this method to the no-war recurrence model, I find that the best results
are reached by models that assume exogeneity (e.g. models 1 and 2 in Table 6). To
estimate equation 1, I selected the following instrumental variables from the model
estimating the determinants of partition: TRUCE (war there a truce?), VREBEL (was
there a rebel victory?), GEO (code for the continent), LOGCOST (log of deaths and
displacements), and EHPOP (ethnic heterogeneity interacted with population size). The
pseudo-R 2 from the first-stage regression was 44.94%, with 79 observations and all
instrumental variables were significant at the .05 level. (Note that the reduced form of
equation 1 also includes the exogenous variables from the structural equation.) I
generated the variable ERROR (the prediction error) by subtracting PART (the actual
values of partition) from its predicted values (PHAT). I then estimated the second stage
equation of no-war recurrence after 2 years (WAREND2) using PHAT instead of PART.
The results are presented in model 4, Table 6. Partition is non-significant. All other
variables remain significant with the exception of EHPOP, which is insignificant as in the
exogenous models. Model 3 incorporates the exogeneity test as discussed above and finds
ERROR to be insignificant. PART is therefore not endogenous and we can rely on the
simple probit estimates of no-war recurrence in Table 6. I use the same procedure to
analyze the relationship between low violence and partitions (see Tables 8 and 9).
equation (1). In my case, the R2was higher than 30%. Further, Guilky, Thomas and Mroz
(1992) present Monte Carlo simulations that suggest that the models' identification must
be less than 75% for the two-step probit estimator to be preferable to the simple probit
(i.e. the overlapping variables in the two equations must be fewer than three fourths of the
total number of right-hand-side variables in the structural equation). In my model, the
overlap is less than 30%, so the model is over-identified.
42  See Alvarez (1997); and Guilkey, Mroz and Taylor (1992). See also Tauchen (1985).
Formulas to compute efficient standard errors can be found in Maddala (1983) and a
method to estimate the asymptotically efficient covariance matrix when the model is
over-identified has been developed by Amemiya (1978).
43 Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz (1995); Guilkey, Mroz and Taylor (1992) find this to be the
best-performing among other exogeneity  tests.
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26Table 1-Post-World  War II Partitions and Secessions
Partitioned  Kaufmann  Kaufmann
State  (1998)  (1996)
Armenia-Azerbaijan-Nag.  (1992)  Secession  partition
Pakistan-Bangladesh  (1971)  Partition  --
Yugoslavia-Croatia (1991; 1995)  Secession  --
Yugoslavia-Bosnia (1992)  Secession  --
Georgia-Abkhazia  (1992-93)  secession  autonomy
Ethiopia- Eritrea (1993)  secession  partition
Somalia-Somaliland (1988)  secession  partition
India-Pakistan  (1947)  partition  partition
Palestine-Israel  (1947)  partition  partition
Lebanon (1990)  partition
Cyprus-TRNC (1974)  partition  partition
Cyprus-TFNC (1964)  --  --
China-Taiwan  (1947)  --
Georgia-Ossetia  --  --
Kashmir-India/Pakistan  (1965)  --  --
USSR-Moldova (1994)  --  --
USSR-Tajikistan  (1994)  --  --
Vietnam-North/South  (1974)  --  --
Yemen-YARIYPR  (1969)  --  --
Korea-North/South  (1953)  --  --
27Table 2-Determinants  of the Incidence of Partition
Logistic Regression of Partition w/ Robust Standard Errors
Cells include coefficients, (standards errors), odds ratios
**  significant  at .01 level;  * significant  at  .05 level
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3a  Model  3b  Model  4
Constant  -9.455796**  -13.13353  *  -6.865768  -7.276098  -8.456494**
(3.403367)  (5.95362)  (3.702501)  (3.910243)  (3.138266)
WARTYPE  2.756235**  2.277975*  2.537376**  2.563987**  1.511414
identity  or non-  (.7976684)  (.9982235)  (1.028002)  (1.03958)  (.7954991)
identity  war?  15.74047  9.756902  12.64644  12.98749  4.533135
LOGCOST  .7109433**  .7289935**  .7248892**  .7566791**  .6205092**
natural  log of deaths  (.2370375)  (.2404796)  (.2833639)  (.3092056)  (.2263398)
& displacements  2.035911  2.072993  2.064502  2.131187  1.859875
EHPOP  3.54e-11**  3.38e-11**  2.81e-11**  2.63e-11**  2.99e-11**
Ethnic  heterogeneity  (6.09e-12)  (8.20e-12)  (6.61e-12)  (6.6  1e-12)  (8.19e-12)
Times  population  1  1  1  1  1
TRUCE  3.379544**  2.627393**  2.959331**  2.784331**  2.988815**
did the conflict  end  (.9358609)  (.8496392)  (.9544361)  (.9556224)  (.8113218)
in an informal  truce?  29.35739  13.83765  19.28506  16.18898  19.86213
VR1EBEL  2.805749**  2.770591**  2.832422**  2.628584**  2.90134**
did the conflict  end  (1.014694)  (1.01471)  (1.064191)  (1.06907)  (.950912)
with  a rebel  victory?  16.53946  15.96807  16.98656  13.85414  18.19852
GEO  -.8501725**  -.5586109  -.6746577  -.6645059
Dummy  for  (.309642)  (.4947611)  (.4018738)  (.3925068)
continent  .4273412  .5720031  .5093307  .5145277
DECADE  -.6526648*  -.4247882  -.4562364  -.4263153
Dummies  for  decade  (.3003585)  (.3914219)  (.2737846)  (.2707541)
in which  war started  .5206565  .6539083  .633664  .6529104
ILLIT  -.0091482
percent  population  (.0295574)
that is illiterate  .9908935
GDP  -.0000648
Real GDP  per  (.0001592)
capita,  PPP-adjusted  .9999352
LIFPES  .0452995
life expectancy  at  (.0779304)
birth  1.046341
GINI  -.0983048*  -.0964209*  -.1119552*
Income  inequality  (.0488386)  (.0460918)  (.0467027)
index  .9063726  .9080817  .8940844
ENERGYS  .0000929  .0000453  .0004845*
Energy  consumption  (.000292)  (.0003034)  (.0002222)
p/c-start  of war  1.000093  1.000045  1.000485
Observations:  125  117  124  116  124
Log-likelihood:  -29.999087  -26.728184  -26.857928  -26.416776  -29.105964
Pseudo-R2:  0.4842  0.4850  0.5367  0.5312  0.4979
Correctly  Classified  88%  88.89%  91.94%  91.38%  88.71%
Reduction  in Error:  31.27%  36.36%  53.83%  50.63%  35.33%
28Table 3-Pre-War  and Post-Partition  Polity Indices  1
GURR-  GURR2  Supports
LAG5  Kaufmann?
SOMALIA  3  2  N
LEBANON  0  5  Y
ISRAEL  N/A  20  N/A
BOSNIA  6  8  Y
INDIA  N/A  16  N/A
YEMEN  4  7  Y
KOREA  1  3  Y
CHINA (Taiwan)  5  2 (Taiwan)  N
AZERBAIJAN  3  2  N
PAKISTAN  N/A  13  N/A
ETHIOPIA  1  9  Y
TAJIKISTAN  11  5  N
GEORGIA  11  12  Y
MOLDOVA  1  12  Y
CYPRUS  N/A  20  N/A
CROATIA  6  9  Y
VIETNAM  7  3  N
29Table 4-OLS  Regressions of Democracy on Partition
w/ Robust Standard Errors
coefficients and standards errors reported (in parentheses)
**  significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
Democracy  Democracy  Democracy
2 years after  2 years after  5 years after
partition (GURR2)  partition (GURR2)  Partition (GURR5)
PARTITION
Did the war result in  1.189178  1.96527  (1.61934)  2.660405
partition?  (1.685325)  (2.294175)
WARTYPE
Was it an identity or  -2.207448*  -2.022481
non-identity war?  (1.01911)  (1.205466)
PEACEOP
Were there UN or  .8448301**  1.094927**
other peace  (.3118129)  (.4408771)
operations?
WARDUR
Duration of war in  .0202179**  .0200054**
months  (.0062344)  (.0067301)
GARM
Size of the  -.0006775**  -.0008592*
govemment military  (.0002499)  (.0003738)
RGDPCH2
Real income per  .0006067  .0006283
capita, PPP-adjusted  (.0003316)  (.0003484)
GURRLAG5
5-yr average pre-war  .4753442**  .4566253**
democracy score  (.0922568)  (.106595)
CONSTANT  3.384225**  3.433024**
(1.140585)  (1.242737)
Observations:  121  116  104
Goodness-of-fit:  F( 1, 68) = 0.50;  F( 7, 65) = 14.46;  F( 7, 60) - 10.62;
P > F = 0.4828  P > F = 0.0000  P > F = 0.0000
R2:  0.0049  0.4091  0.4000
Notes:  RGDPCH2  is significant  at the 7% level  in both  GURR2  and GURR5  models  (there  may  be
measurement  problems  causing  this result);  WARTYPE  is significant  at the 10%  level in GURR5  model.
The  results  are not affected  if we drop  all (6) cases  of ongoing  war. Partition  in  that case  (with 110
observations)  has a coefficient  and standard  error of 1.305271  and 1.711889,  respectively.  The standard
errors  in other  variables  are not significantly  different.
30Table 5-Cross-Tabs  Between Partition,  War End, and No Violence
War  War  Partition  No  Total  Pearson  Chi-Square
Ended for:  Recurrence  Partition  cases  Test (1 degree of
freedom)
2 years  War  6  31  37  X  = 0.0563
No War  16  73  89  Pr > X 2 = 0.813
5 years  War  9  30  39  X2 = 1.3832
No War  12  71  83  Pr > X 2 = 0.240
10 years  War  7  34  41  X2 =1.0194
No War  6  53  59  Pr > X
2 = 0.313
2 years  Violence  14  61  75  X2= 0.1871
No Violence  8  43  51  Pr > X2= 0.665
5 years  Violence.  14  62  76  X2= 0.2064
No Violence  7  39  46  Pr > X2= 0.650
10 years  Violence  11  59  70  X2 =0.0054
No Violence  5  28  33  Pr > X2= 0.941
31Table 6-Probit,  Two-Stage Probit, and 2SLS Regressions of War Recurrence
Reported are (in that order):
Coefficients, Standards Errors reported (in parentheses), and Marginals (dF/dx)
** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
Dependent variable:  Model 1:  Model 2:  Model 3:  Model 4:  Model 5:
WAREND2  Probit  Probit  Model 1 +  Two-Stage  2SLS
(Did the War End for  Coefficients  Coefficients  Predicted  Probit  Linear Prob.
Two years?)  assume  Assume  ERROR  assume  assume
exogeneity  exogeneity  Exog. Test  endogeneity  endogeneity
PART  .4675507  .1856842  .6313446  .1387129
Did the war result in  (.3941159)  (.3784898)  (.6819386)  (.2355181)
partition?  .1479941  .0611209  .1941839  ...
PHAT  .5913822
Predicted PART,  (.7077184)
Endogenous model  .2049279
LOGCOST  -.3252886**  -.3328365**  -.332326**  -.0897743**
natural log of dead &  (.0885536)  (.0854494)  (.085)  (.0213588)
displaced  -.1114577  -.1144016  -.1151588  ...
LOGDEAD  -.2682522**
natural log of dead  (.0956481)
_.0909463
OUTCOME2  .5782091**  .4867044**  .5682588**  .5631912**  .1539604**
outcomeofthewar-  (.1489188)  (.1456174)  (.1544935)  (.1539989)  (.0372131)
four outcomes  .198119  .1650087  .1953203  .1951591  ...
GDP  -.0002298**  -.0002725**  -.0002404**  -.0002382**  -.0000671**
Real income per capita,  (.0000768)  (.0000839)  (.0000714)  (.0000755)  (.0000179)
PPP-adjusted  -.0000787  -.0000924  -.0000826  -.0000825  ...
WARDUR  .0049005**  ..004069**  .0051255**  .0050525**  .001221*
Duration of war in  (.0014821)  (.0013147)  (.0016844)  (.001708)  (.0004957)
months  .0016791  .0013795  .0017617  .0017508  ...
GARM  .0006856*  .0008484*  .0006697*  .0005926*  .0001236**
size of the gov't military  (.0003447)  (.0004315)  (.0003326)  (.0002988)  (.0000304)
in '000s  .0002349  .0002876  .0002302  .0002053  ...
EHPOP  1.14e-11  1.37e-11  .Ille-Il  1.34e-11  1.72e-12
Ethnicheterogeneity  (1.06e-11)  (1.24e-11)  (l.lOe-11)  (1.29e-11)  (1.59e-12)
times population,'000  3.89e-12  4.66e-12  3.82e-12  4.63e-12
CONSTANT  2.881436**  2.042677*  2.959863**  2.982153**  1.351**
(1.095438)  (1.021513)  (1.058804)  (1.065484)  (.2785242)
ERROR  .2469214
(.9434092)
Observations:  79  79  79  79  79
Log-Likelihood:  -35.363516  -38.399442  -35.327581  -35.557351  ...
Pseudo-R2:  0.3115  0.2524  0.3122  0.3077  R2=  0.3302
F(6,45)= 14.83
% Correctly Classified:  76.25%  72.50%  76.25%  77.50%  P>F = 0.000
ReductioninError:  32.14%  21.42%  32.14%  35.71%  ...
32Table 7-Probit  Regressions of No-Violence (PART assumed exogenous)
Coefficients, Standards Errors reported (in parentheses), and Marginals (dF/dx)
**  signficant  at the .01  level; *  significant at the .05  level
Dependent variable:  Core Model 1  Expanded  Expanded  Model 2 w/  Model 2 wl
NOVIOL2 (No  (from No-War  Model 2  Model 3  NOVIOL5  NOVIOL10
violence for 2 years?)  Recurrence)  (5 yrs later)  (10 yrs later)
PART  -.1173397  1.199797**  .6952224  .8030144  -.2016296
Did the war result in  (.382458)  (.4588179)  (.5756121)  (.4905215)  (.588907)
partition?  -.0354151  .3525391  .2179602  .1929701  -.0529321
LOGCOST  -.5223588**  -.5321552**  -.1434569
Natural Log of  (.1148021)  (.1172672)  (.1095949)
Deaths/displacements  -.1190405  -.1010965  -.0397195
LOGDEAD  -.2012708*  -.3138064**
Natural Log of Deaths  (.0868508)  (.0707336)
-.0621308  -.0865803
OUTCOME2  .3539934**
Outcome of the war-  (.1185438)
four outcomes  .1092751
TRUCE  -3.022725**  -1.925652**  -2.967797**  -.7167226
Did the war end in an  (.7741248)  (.7421893)  (.8298819)  (.8073509)
informal truce?  -.3004362  -.2951101  -.2385855  -.1510695
MILOUT  -1.882494**  -1.929345**  -.8828198
Did the war end in a  (.4223771)  (.4418657)  (.4803803)
Military Victory?  -.4902831  -.464703  -.2730445
VREBEL  -.0636766
Military victory by the  (.6037123)
rebels  -.0172447
UNOPS  .5595692**  .4463608*  .7131684**  .1425513
Type of UN peace  (.2106261)  (.1971804)  (.1965163)  (.2376949)
operation, if any  .1275204  .1231525  .1354846  .0394688
GDP  -.0000971
Real income per capita,  (.0000953)
PPP-adjusted  -.00003
WARDUR  .0055333**  .0075538**  .0056893**  .0056921*  .0028134
Duration of war in  (.0019035)  (.0020946)  (.0018943)  (.0029687)  (.0025852)
months  .0017081  .0017214  .0015697  .0010814  .000779
GARM  -.0001866
Size of the government  (.0002709)
military  -.0000576
EHiPOP  8.64e-12*
Ethnic heterogeneity  (3.80e-12)
* population in '000s  2.67e-12
EH  .0118966**  .0092106  .0120659*  -.0008874
Ethnic heterogeneity  (.0054007)  (.0050258)  (.0056764)  (.0053524)
index  .0027111  .0025412  .0022922  -.0002457
MAJOR  -.635182  -.5132059  -.7930115  .4178209
Was there a major  (.4774207)  (.3641417)  (.4937591)  (.3998982)
power involved?  -.1349126  -.1345819  -.1361881  .1204863
INTERVEN  .2431056  -.0618314  .1811481  -.1164628
Was there a partial 3rd-  (.4664523)  (.3696712)  (.4767975)  (.5039971)
party intervention  .0540725  -.0171447  .0337408  -.0325905
CONSTANT  .4611069  5.174985**  1.594716*  5.440211**  1.359764
(.9371432)  (1.280112)  (.7779688)  (1.297022)  1.382238
Observations  79  79  79  76  64
Log-Likelihood  -36.426798  -25.813145  -33.59478  -24.666494  -30.230899
Pseudo-R 2 0.2205  0.4476  0.2811  0.4228  0.1008
Classification success  76.25%  82.50%  80%  82.50%  76.25%
33Table 8-Probit  Regressions of No Violence & Exogeneity Tests for Partition
Coefficients and Standards Errors (in parentheses) reported
** significant at the .01 level; * significant at the .05 level
Dependent  Model 2,  Model 2,  Model 2  Model 3,  Model 3,  Model 3
variable:  Assuming  Assuming  With  Assuming  Assuming  With
NOVIOL2  PART is  PART is  Exogeneity  PART is  PART is  Exogeneity
Exogenous  Endogenous  Test  Exogenous  Endogenous  Test
PART  1.199797**  3.102773**  .6952224  1.00539
(.4588179)  (.7686473)  (.5756121)  (1.062802)
PPART  2.981141**  .9735567
(.6974166)  (1.064095)
ERRORI  2.57912**  .4116839
(.9826157)  (1.375607)
LOGCOST  -.5223588**  -.5603876**  -.5742567**
(.1148021)  (.1237784)  (.1287287)
LOGDEAD  -.3138064**  -.3015169**  -.3112069**
(.0707336)  (.0713367)  (.0722707)
TRUCE  -3.022725**  -3.970906**  -4.136922**  -1.925652**  -2.036329*  -2.109765*
(.7741248)  (.9945747)  (1.029862)  (.7421893)  (.9302379)  (.9396101)
MILOUT  -1.882494**  -1.83591**  -1.881158**
(.4223771)  (.417109)  (.4146323)
VREBEL  -.0636766  -.1615568  -.1494816
(.6037123)  (.7782495)  (.7241343)
UNOPS  .5595692**  .3396208  .350025  .4463608*  .3842851  .3987719
(.2106261)  (.200846)  (.2073427)  (.1971804)  (.2410587)  (.2437178)
WARDUR  .0075538**  .0092044**  .009044**  .0056893**  .0059408**  .0058713**
(.0020946)  (.0022266)  (.0021347)  (.0018943)  (.0016182)  (.0017245)
EH  .0118966*  .0112497*  .0111529*  .0092106  .009164  .0090436
(.0054007)  (.0057092)  (.0056794)  (.0050258)  (.0051547)  (.0050582)
MAJOR  -.635182  -.7059195  -.7640957  -.5132059  -.4606447  -.5287535
(.4774207)  (.5077376)  (.4736401)  (.3641417)  (.3720948)  (.3661297)
INTERVEN  .2431056  .2522566  .3041237  -.0618314  -.0970134  -.0551541
(.4664523)  (.4811071)  (.4997109)  (.3696712)  (.3748457)  (.3681889)
CONST.  5.174985**  5.4026**  5.565602**  1.594716*  1.472595  1.560312*
(1.280112)  (1.366388)  (1.412317)  (.7779688)  (.7808925)  (.78567)
Observations  79  79  79  79  79  79
Log-Likel.:  -25.813145  -24.362231  -24.114537  -33.59478  -33.990883  -33.541741
Pseudo-R2:  0.4476  0.4787  0.4840  0.2811  0.2726  0.2822
34Table 9-Comparisons  of Endogenous Models of No-Violence
(PART Assumed Endogenous-instruments:  GEO, VREBEL, EHPOP, LOGCOST)
Coefficients and Standards Errors (in parentheses) reported
** significant at: the .01 level; * at the .05 level
Dependent  Probit  2SLS  2-Stage  2-Stage  Probit  Bootstraps 2
variable:  model  Linear  Probit  model w/  (1,000  reps)
NOVIOL2  (PART  Probability  model  exogeneity  test  of
assumed  model  (Bollen  et. al.)  (Rivers & Vuong)  2-Stage  Probit
exogenous)  (robust  se)  (robust  se)  (robust  se)  (of column 3)
PART  .4661597  .1009254  -.0309128
(.391604)  (.1640547)  .5031775




LOGCOST  -.4808962**  -.0801026**  -.4411599**  -.4611771**  -.5545976
(.1118162)  (.0223824)  (.0980823)  (.1075544)  (.2758333)
WARDUR  .0057357*  .001268*  .0052047*  .0053461*  .0057597
(.0023759)  (.0005909)  (.0023586)  (.002441)  (.0042879)
EH  .0167294**  .0034935**  .0162025**  .0166898**  .0202565
(.0057792)  (.001289)  (.0058588)  (.0059472)  (.0113026)
GURRLAG5  -.0748628*  -.0150666*  -.074177*  -.0736467*  -.0912548
(.0316421)  (.0080138)  (.031699)  (.0324005)  (.0636829)
OUTCOME2  .663262**  .1321149**  .6709066**  .6876048**  .8656116
(.1512262)  (.0343555)  (.1462798)  (.1567451)  (.4044652)
CONST.  2.357025*  .7722106*  2.077755  2.211974*
(1.147271)  (.3212511)  (1.083811)  (1.129779)  ...
Observations  76  76  76  76  1,000
Log-Lik.  -28.170411  ...  -28.629618  -27.792921  ...
K2  0.3569  0.3109  0.3464  0.3655  ...
I If the predecessor state was a colony before the war started, then we do not have a
GURRLAG5 score since the index is only available for sovereign states. Those cases are
marked as N/A, as are cases in which the country's independence was the result of a civil
war, as in the case of Israel.
2 Coefficient  means and standard  deviations  (in parentheses)  are reported.
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